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ABSTRACT
This report concerns a prolonged restaurant-associated outbreak of infection caused by a multidrug-
resistant (ASSuT) strain of Salmonella Typhimurium, phage-type U302, which took place during July and
August 2003 and affected people from Denmark and neighbouring countries who had attended a
specific restaurant. The outbreak comprised 67 laboratory-verified cases and ten probable cases;
however, the actual number of patients was estimated to be more than 390. The outbreak strain was
isolated from a buffet which was probably contaminated by an assistant chef who was found to excrete
the epidemic strain. An attack rate of 7.3% was estimated and long incubation periods were observed,
including one extreme instance of 27 days. This outbreak underscores the importance of conscientious
personal hygiene, including frequent washing of hands, for professionals handling food.
Keywords Antimicrobial resistance, food infection, international outbreak, outbreak, Salmonella Typhimurium,
surveillance
Original Submission: 27 January 2004; Accepted: 7 May 2004
Clin Microbiol Infect 2004; 10: 904–910
INTRODUCTION
Food-borne Salmonella infections constitute a con-
siderable public health problem throughout the
Western world. In most countries, Salmonella
enterica subspecies enterica serovar Typhimurium
(S. Typhimurium) is the first or second most
prevalent serotype [1–3]. Although most cases of
S. Typhimurium appear to be sporadic, outbreaks
represent an important means of transmission of
this agent, and the literature describes a number
of different modes of transmission [4,5]. The
detection and resolution of outbreaks, as well as
an understanding of their epidemiology, are
important in the direct and indirect control of
this agent.
The number of S. Typhimurium cases peaked
in Denmark in the late 1980s because of a high
level of infection in domestically produced poul-
try, and again in the early 1990s, primarily
because of infection in pigs. Large-scale national
efforts to control Salmonella infections in the farm-
to-fork chain have resulted in a steady decline in
the number of infections [6]. However, the control
of infection in production animals, and the sub-
sequent reduction in both sporadic cases and
outbreaks caused by contaminated meat, may
have little effect on outbreaks mediated by infec-
ted individuals. This report describes a prolonged
outbreak of S. Typhimurium infection traced to a
single restaurant and, in all likelihood, to a single
member of staff found to excrete the organism
involved.
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MATERIALS AND METHODS
Laboratory-based surveillance
The diagnosis of enteric bacterial pathogens was performed at
the Statens Serum Institut (SSI) or at one of 11 regional clinical
microbiology laboratories in Denmark during 2003 [7]. The SSI
was notified of all positive findings and received all Salmonella
isolates from the external laboratories. Salmonella isolates were
serotyped according to the Kauffmann–White serotyping
scheme [8]. All S. Typhimurium isolates were characterised
further by: (1) antibiotic MICs determined with the Sensititre
system (TREK Diagnostic Systems, East Grinstead, UK); (2)
phage-typing [9]; and (3) pulsed-field gel electrophoresis
(PFGE) analysis using the Pulse-Net standard protocol [10]
with restriction enzyme XbaI. PFGE data were analysed with
BioNumerics software (Applied Maths, Kortrijk, Belgium), and
a UPGMA tree was generated using the Dice similarity
coefficient. Phage-typing was performed at the Danish Insti-
tute for Food and Veterinary Research. Salmonella surveillance
data are published on the Internet in an open-access format
with weekly updates [11]. On suspicion of outbreaks, or when
patients with multidrug-resistant (MDR) S. Typhimurium
isolates (resistant or intermediately susceptible to four or more
classes of antibiotics) are found, the patients and ⁄ or their
treating physicians are contacted by telephone.
Food control system
Responsibility for the supervision of enterprises handling
food, including restaurants, is regionally based in Denmark,
and microbiological examination of food items is performed at
six regional laboratories. Samples were examined for the
presence of coliform bacteria and Salmonella by the methods of
the Nordic Committee on Food Analysis [12,13], but using
Modified Semi-Solid Rappaport-Vassiliadis Medium [14].
Case definition
Cases were recorded as ‘confirmed’ if they had gastroenteritis,
had eaten at the incriminated restaurant between 17 July and 7
August 2003, and had S. Typhimurium isolated from their
stools. Cases were recorded as ‘probable’ if they had gastro-
enteritis and had eaten at the incriminated restaurant during
the same period in the company of a confirmed case, but no
stool culture was performed.
RESULTS
The outbreak
The outbreak was first suspected when a woman
hospitalised with severe gastroenteritis, on 31 July
2003, indicated a particular restaurant as the
possible source of her infection. The Regional
Food Authority (RFA) responsible for the super-
vision of the restaurant in question was notified
on the same day and an inspection was carried
out. Samples for bacteriological examination were
taken from the kitchen and the prepared food, but
there were no visible problems and the general
hygiene standards were found to be acceptable.
At the same time, a rise in the number of
S. Typhimurium isolates (antigenic profile
O:4,12; H:i,1.2) with a particular antibiotic resist-
ance profile (ASSuT, i.e., ampicillin, streptomycin,
sulphamethoxazole and tetracycline resistance)
was noted at the SSI. Patient interviews were
initiated on 7 August, and, after it was found that
four patients became ill after eating at the same
restaurant, the RFA was contacted. The Swedish
Institute for Infectious Disease Control contacted
the RFA independently because of the appearance
of an unusually high number of Swedish patients
infected with S. Typhimurium who reported
visiting Copenhagen. The RFA closed the restaur-
ant on the morning of 8 August, and no further
cases were reported subsequently. Faecal samples
were collected from the kitchen staff, and
S. Typhimurium was isolated from the sample
of one of the employees, as well as from samples
taken from the buffet served in the restaurant.
The investigation of the restaurant
The restaurant involved in the outbreak is one of
35 restaurants located in an amusement park
situated close to Copenhagen and frequented by
both local visitors and tourists. Most guests at this
restaurant selected a buffet consisting of a variety
of meat, potato and pasta dishes, and a large
selection of raw vegetables. The RFA inspected
the restaurant on 31 July and took two samples
from the buffet for microbiological examina-
tion—one from a bowl containing cold cooked
pasta, and one pooled from four bowls containing
chopped tomatoes, cucumber, green peppers and
iceberg lettuce, respectively. These samples were
chosen because the initial case reported eating
‘pasta salad’ from the buffet. Laboratory analysis
revealed S. Typhimurium in 25 g of material from
both samples. In addition, faecal coliform bacteria
were found at counts of 2300 CFU ⁄ g in the pasta
and 360 CFU ⁄ g in the pooled raw vegetables.
Faecal samples from the three individuals
employed in the kitchen were taken on 8 August;
one sample was positive for S. Typhimurium, and
the two other samples were negative. The staff
member excreting the bacteria, who had worked
in the restaurant daily during the period from 17
July to 7 August, was not ill and did not
remember having had diarrhoea or other signs
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of enteritis. The restaurant was closed by the RFA
on the morning of 8 August, and all personnel
were dismissed by the owners. On the owners’
initiative, a private professional bacteriological
analysis was undertaken the same evening.
Twenty-four samples of food items in stock and
swabs of surfaces in the kitchen were negative for
Salmonella.
A buffet was prepared on 11 August to deter-
mine whether the problem still existed. Eight
samples were taken by the RFA, including the
pasta and the vegetables that had initially tested
positive and the three types of meat served, i.e.,
ham, beef and spare-ribs, all of which were
negative for Salmonella or other pathogenic bac-
teria. Special attention was given to the spare-ribs,
which were delivered raw and frozen every
2–3 days from the same supplier and from the
same imported batch, and were thus potentially
implicated in the infections. However, 25 g of
material were negative for Salmonella on four
different occasions: on export from the country of
production, on sampling at the restaurant on 8
and 11 August, and again in October when the
RFA tested four additional samples from the
remainder of the batch at the supplier.
The RFA inspection of the restaurant on 31 July
revealed only one breach of regulations, namely a
non-functional staff toilet, necessitating that staff
and customers used the same toilet facilities.
Otherwise, the apparent hygiene level and the
hygienic procedures, as reported by the manager,
were acceptable, and included the separation of
raw and ready-to-eat products, discarding all left-
overs at the end of each day, and washing
the kitchen utensils and the buffet containers.
The various cooling systems were adequate. The
restaurant was allowed to re-open on 14 August,
at which time it had been thoroughly cleaned, had
received new deliveries of all food, and had
undergone a complete change of staff.
Patients
Forty laboratory-verified Danish patients were
detected through the passive laboratory surveil-
lance system, and all reported eating from the
buffet at the restaurant in question. One patient,
who worked in the amusement park, ate there on
several occasions, but the others visited the
restaurant only once, independently of each other.
In addition to these confirmed cases, there were
five probable cases, i.e., patients who ate at the
restaurant in the company of confirmed cases, but
did not undergo microbiological examination.
In addition to the Danish patients, 22 confirmed
cases and one probable case were identified by
the Swedish Institute for Infectious Disease Con-
trol, and four confirmed cases and one probable
case were identified by the Norwegian Institute of
Public Health. These patients all ate at the
restaurant on a single occasion within the period
during which the outbreak occurred, although
one of them did not remember the date precisely.
Furthermore, two members of a family from
Germany who had eaten at the restaurant devel-
oped enteritis; one of these was examined, and
S. Typhimurium was found. This person contac-
ted the RFA in Denmark on reading about the
outbreak. The SSI sent out an alert through Enter-
Net, the European Salmonella outbreak network
[15], on 18 August, which requested information
about any possible patients, but no further cases
were discovered. An overview of the various
patients is given in Table 1.
The age of the 66 confirmed Danish, Swedish
and Norwegian patients ranged from 2 to
69 years. Half of the patients were aged
25–46 years (median 38 years). There were
29 females and 37 males. One-third (23 patients)
were hospitalised as a result of the infection.
Fig. 1A shows the date of onset of symptoms of
the confirmed Danish, Swedish and Norwegian
patients, and Fig. 1B the date on which they ate at
the restaurant.
Sub-typing of isolates
The outbreak strain was clearly distinguished
from other S. Typhimurium strains by PFGE
analysis (Fig. 2). The isolates from 40 confirmed
Danish patients all had identical PFGE patterns
(the outbreak type). Furthermore, all these isolates
Table 1. Overview of patients forming part of the out-
break
Nationality
of cases
No. of
confirmed
cases
No. of
probable
cases
No. of
groups
eating at the
restaurant
Total no. of
patrons in
groups
Danish 40 7 40 176
Swedish 22 1 15 110
Norwegian 4 1 3 15
German 1 1 1 5
Total 67 10 59 306
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were phage-type U302, and all but one was of
resistance type (R-type) ASSuT, with the last
isolate being fully susceptible. The isolate from
the implicated staff member, and the two isolates
from the restaurant food, were also subjected to
PFGE analysis and were found to belong to the
outbreak type. These isolates were also R-type
ASSuT and phage-type U302. Isolates from the
Swedish patients were not routinely typed by
PFGE, but 11 of the Swedish isolates were sent to
the SSI for PFGE typing and all were found to
belong to the outbreak type.
The total number of S. Typhimurium isolates
from individual patients in Denmark during 2003
was 450. The outbreak type was represented by
46 isolates, constituting 10.2% of the total
S. Typhimurium isolates, and one of exactly 100
different PFGE profiles detected. Among the 44
human isolates of S. Typhimurium in Denmark
during the year 2002 that had been typed by
PFGE, the outbreak type was only present
once. The R-type ASSuT constituted 4.4% of
S. Typhimurium isolates in the 5-year period
immediately before this outbreak.
Four of the six Danish patients infected with
the outbreak strain who had not eaten at the
restaurant became ill at the time of the outbreak.
The route of infection was uncertain in three
cases, but the fourth was a likely case of secon-
dary transmission, since he fell ill 3 days follow-
ing the admittance of his 3-year-old son to
hospital with gastroenteritis. No sample was
taken from the son, who had eaten at the
implicated restaurant in the company of his
grandparent, who also developed gastroenteritis.
The child and his grandparent were therefore
included among the probable outbreak cases.
Two patients were infected with the outbreak
strain shortly after the outbreak had ended while
staying in southern Europe.
All S. Typhimurium isolates of R-type ASSuT
obtained during 2002 and 2003 as part of the
Danish Salmonella surveillance programme of
food and animals were sought in an attempt to
determine the route of introduction of the bacter-
ium into the restaurant. This resistance profile is
comparatively rare, but the search yielded 108
isolates, most of which were of phage-type
DT120. Eighteen isolates, the remaining isolates
plus five of the DT120 isolates, were typed by
PFGE using XbaI. A single isolate from a Danish
pork sample in January 2002 was found to be
identical to the epidemic strain involved in the
restaurant outbreak.
Attack rate and incubation periods
The attack rate of the outbreak was estimated in
three different ways. All patients but one visited
the restaurant on one occasion only, and all did so
in the company of others. There were 59 groups,
ranging in size from two to 16 (median four),
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Fig. 1. (a) Date of disease onset for the 66 Danish, Swedish
and Norwegian laboratory-verified patients who reported
eating at the restaurant. (b) Date of visit to the restaurant of
the 64 Danish, Swedish and Norwegian laboratory-verified
patients who visited the restaurant once only and
remembered the date of the visit.
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Fig. 2. UPGMA tree showing the relationship between the
outbreak strain (PFGE type 1) and the five other most
common PFGE types in Denmark during the outbreak
period (PFGE types 2–6). The phage-types of the Swedish
outbreak strains were not determined.
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accounting for a total of 306 people, most of
whom had eaten from the buffet (see Table 1).
Seventy-seven confirmed and probable cases
among these 306 individuals gives an attack rate
for salmonellosis of 25.2%. However, this calcu-
lation was based on groups of people in which
one person is bound to have been ill. Excluding
one patient from each group, there were 18
patients among a total of 247 individuals, which
gives an attack rate of 7.3%. Finally, a third
estimate was based on the total number of known
patients relative to all exposed persons, i.e., all
customers of the restaurant. The total of 77 known
cases, in conjunction with a total of 5357 paying
customers between 17 July and 4 August (as
indicated by the restaurant accounts), gives a
minimal attack rate of 1.4%.
The incubation periods (Fig. 3) could be esti-
mated for 64 of the confirmed patients because
they had visited the restaurant on one occasion
only and clearly remembered the date of the visit,
and because the chance that a patient who had
eaten at the restaurant and was infected by the
outbreak strain had acquired the infection else-
where was extremely low. Four days was the
median period between eating at the restaurant
and the first symptoms. One-quarter of the
patients had incubation periods ‡ 6 days, and
two patients had very long incubation periods of
26 and 27 days, respectively. One of these, a
42-year-old woman, was among a group that
became ill after eating at the restaurant, and may
theoretically have contracted the infection by
secondary transmission. The other was a
27-year-old woman who was otherwise healthy
and had received no medication in the period
between eating at the restaurant and the onset of
symptoms.
DISCUSSION
Although the outbreak was traced to the buffet of
a particular restaurant, and terminated following
closure of the restaurant, the question of trans-
mission was not resolved. An important charac-
teristic of the outbreak was that patients became
infected over a period of 3 weeks, which may be
explained by: (1) continuous use of a single batch
of contaminated food; (2) continuous contamin-
ation of food via contaminated utensils or surfa-
ces; or (3) contamination of food via restaurant
personnel excreting the bacterium. The first pos-
sibility seems unlikely, since extensive sampling
at the restaurant revealed no contaminated prod-
ucts. The duration of the outbreak and the fact
that food was prepared fresh daily in a generally
hygienic setting argues against the second possi-
bility. The discovery of a member of the kitchen
staff infected with the outbreak strain makes the
third possibility the most likely. This hypothesis is
supported by further information: (1) the discov-
ery of faecal coliform bacteria, which are gener-
ally a sign of contamination with human faeces, in
the samples from the buffet; (2) the fact that the
outbreak strain was found in cooked pasta and
salad, indicating that cross-contamination
occurred in the kitchen of the restaurant; and (3)
low attack rates and long incubation periods,
which both indicate low-grade contamination of
food, again consistent with the hypothesis of
contamination by an excreting member of staff.
Although the route of infection of the staff
member is not known, the presence of the
outbreak strain in several unrelated sporadic
cases indicates that the strain is circulating in
the community at a low rate, an idea supported
further by the detection of the outbreak type
among human S. Typhimurium isolates from
Denmark from the year 2002 and from a Danish
meat sample. Therefore, it seems possible that the
staff member acquired the infection via the
community and introduced it into the restaurant.
Alternatively, he may have been among the initial
victims of the outbreak and subsequently respon-
sible for its prolonged course.
Outbreaks spread by excreting restaurant staff
are rarely reported. There have been few such
outbreaks within the last decade among more
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Fig. 3. Number of days between visit to the restaurant and
disease onset of the 64 Danish, Swedish and Norwegian
confirmed patients who visited the restaurant once only
and remembered the date of the visit.
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than 10 000 restaurants in Denmark, with the
most prominent being a large 6-week outbreak of
S. Enteritidis PT 34 infection which originated at a
Chinese restaurant in central Copenhagen during
the summer of 1999 [16]. However, although rare,
these outbreaks may affect more people than
restaurant outbreaks caused by contaminated
food because they may last longer. The period
in which individuals infected with non-typhoid
Salmonella strains shed the bacteria varies with
age and serotype, but 40% of non-symptomatic
infected cases have been found to excrete Salmon-
ella after 4 weeks, falling to 14% after 8 weeks
[17]. An investigation by the Minnesota Depart-
ment of Health [18] showed that 10% of staff at
restaurants associated with Salmonella outbreaks
shed the bacteria, with most of the positive staff
being asymptomatic.
Several other noteworthy features of this out-
break are related to its size, attack rate, incubation
periods, multidrug resistance, sub-typing and
surveillance. The outbreak comprised 40 inde-
pendent culture-confirmed patients, making it
one of the larger S. Typhimurium outbreaks in
Denmark to date. Furthermore, the outbreak
was international, spreading into Sweden and
Norway, and probably to other countries. The
scope of the outbreak was probably a result of a
prolonged period of contamination in a restaur-
ant that attracts many visitors from a large
geographical region. Warm summer weather
may also have contributed to the magnitude of
the outbreak.
All the attack rates, which were calculated in
three different ways, were fairly modest, which
was an indication of low-grade contamination of
the food. The minimal attack rate of 1.4, based on
the assumption that no more than the 77 regis-
tered patients could be found, represents an
underestimate, because the national laboratory
surveillance of Salmonella records only a fraction
of the total cases in the community. The maximal
attack rate, on the other hand, represents an
overestimate, as it is based on a selection of
groups eating at the restaurant in which at least
one member acquired salmonellosis. The third
way of calculating the attack rate circumvents
this problem by excluding the index patient from
each group, although this may lead to some
underestimation of the true attack rate. A rough
estimate of the true size of the outbreak would
be 390 individuals (7.3% of 5357), with the lower
limit being 77 (the known patients) and the
upper limit being 1350 (25.2% of 5357).
The 4-day medium incubation period is long
compared to the textbook periods of 6–48 h [5] or
8–72 h [4], which is again consistent with low-
grade contamination of the restaurant food. The
relationship between a low infectious dose and
long incubation periods and low attack rates in
outbreaks of Salmonella infection has been des-
cribed previously on several occasions [4,5]. An
incubation period of almost 4 weeks was found in
two instances in this outbreak; although these
patients may have acquired the infection from
elsewhere, this possibility was regarded as
unlikely. We are not aware of other studies in
which incubation periods of similar length for
non-typhoid Salmonella have been reported.
The outbreak described in this study was
caused by an MDR S. Typhimurium strain of
phage-type U302. MDR U302 deserves to be
monitored closely in the light of experience
with the related S. Typhimurium phage-type
MDT DT104, which has emerged rapidly in many
Western countries [19]. It is possible that U302,
like DT104 [19], is a ‘success clone’, and that this
may have been a contributing factor in the
propagation of this outbreak. However, MDR
outbreak strains also pose the unwelcome prob-
lems of potential treatment failure and spread of
resistance genes. Indeed, a recent Danish study
has documented an increased mortality of MDR
strains compared to sensitive S. Typhimurium
strains [20].
All Danish S. Typhimurium strains are rou-
tinely phage-typed and tested for antibiotic resist-
ance, and at the time of the outbreak, they were
also subjected to real-time PFGE. The results of
the resistance testing were the first to be available;
the outbreak was recognised initially on the basis
of antibiograms alone. Antibiograms remain
important outbreak surveillance tools—at least
for S. Typhimurium, in which resistance genes are
frequently present.
This outbreak also underscored the strengths
and weaknesses of the laboratory-based surveil-
lance system. The system efficiently detects all
outbreaks of a certain size, especially if the strain
involved possesses a special trait—in this case, a
distinct resistance profile. However, outbreaks are
not recognised immediately because of certain
features of the system: patients with salmonellosis
will typically tolerate symptoms for several days
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before seeing a doctor; the sample must be
transported to the laboratory and await isolation,
typing and possibly sub-typing of the infectious
agent; and the results must be recorded in the
designated database and brought to the attention
of an epidemiologist. In this particular instance,
the system functioned effectively and the various
institutions involved in the process cooperated
smoothly. The outbreak was detected and the
source was determined almost simultaneously via
the laboratory surveillance system and the field-
work of the food authorities. Although the swift
intervention of the latter in closing down the
restaurant probably contributed to timely con-
tainment, the outbreak nevertheless continued for
3 weeks and was responsible for illness in a very
large number of people.
The limitations of the power of the food
authorities is another issue. Under Danish legis-
lation, faecal samples can only be obtained if the
individuals in question volunteer to submit them.
Obtaining such samples was highly important in
resolving the current outbreak, and the willing-
ness of the restaurant’s managers and staff to
cooperate was an important factor in the success-
ful investigation of this outbreak. Last but not
least, this outbreak also highlighted the import-
ance of conscientious personal hygiene and fre-
quent washing of hands on the part of all
individuals handling food for public consump-
tion.
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